The Chinese EV “Revival Alliance”: A Tale of Promises and Pitfalls
“Love at first sight! No exaggeration, this is the Maybach of the new energy world.” In the eyes of a Lebanese tycoon, HiPhi was the “queen” of Chinese electric vehicles—he fell in love at first sight and wanted to revive her. But when it came time to actually pay up, he became picky and critical.
Neta Auto, holding dual manufacturing licenses, has been revived, with investors crowding the registration channel. Netizens joke: “The myth is unfolding, we’re just waiting for Taiyi Zhenren to appear.” WM Motor, having found its “white knight,” has announced a goal of producing one million vehicles annually by 2030.
Busy to live, or busy to die?
In 2025, within the Chinese EV landscape, on one side we have NIO, Xpeng, and Li Auto on “the same boat,” engaged in fierce competition and internal struggles. On the other side, the “WHN trio” (WM Motor, HiPhi, Neta) have been kicked off the boat but are still struggling to survive, with their “Revival Alliance” drama playing out.
Both sides are bustling with activity, making it hard to know where to look. But behind all this excitement may lie elaborate scams.
1.Neta’s Rebirth: The Revival Channel Packed with “Taiyi Zhenren”
On August 4th, Hozon New Energy’s administrator published an announcement about publicly recruiting restructuring investors. In just four days, the Neta Auto parent company’s investor recruitment on Alibaba’s asset platform attracted over 10,000 views and 65 prospective applicants.
“The most valuable thing Hozon has right now is that manufacturing license; everything else is probably hopeless,” commented one netizen upon hearing news of Neta Auto’s potential resumption of production. Indeed, the most valuable asset of Neta Auto’s parent company, Hozon New Energy, is its dual manufacturing licenses.
Thanks to these independent manufacturing licenses, while other startups were still desperately seeking contract manufacturing ten years ago, Hozon New Energy could acquire land, build factories, and manufacture vehicles independently. Ten years later, even while going through bankruptcy restructuring, Hozon New Energy remains a hot commodity in this sector due to its dual licenses, attracting nearly dozens of “Taiyi Zhenren” eager to invest.
The barrier to entry for Hozon New Energy’s bankruptcy restructuring investors is not low: first, applicants must pay a 50 million yuan registration deposit before September 15th. The ultimately selected restructuring investor must also pay a 100 million yuan investment guarantee within three working days of signing the relevant agreement.
Despite the high threshold, investor enthusiasm remains high. As of August 14th, four more “Taiyi Zhenren” with 50 million yuan in hand had joined Neta Auto’s revival registration channel, bringing the total to 69 applicants. For context, other similar projects on Alibaba’s asset platform typically have 0-3 investors, with few garnering even thousands of views—demonstrating just how attractive Neta Auto is.
Recently, many Neta Auto owners across the country have received notifications from 4S stores about free maintenance services. Some owners who drove to stores for battery testing found new locations still under renovation. “Is this a company that’s half-bankrupt but not quite?” owners joke. If Neta Auto successfully revives, the happiest would be its 460,000 owners nationwide, along with remaining Neta employees.
Automotive Business Review learned that Neta Auto still has over 400 employees, including management teams and core technical R&D personnel. The good news is that multiple sources indicate July salaries for current employees have been paid in full, and recalled staff’s overdue wages have been resolved. However, the bad news is that most former employees’ overdue wages and compensation remain unresolved.
The administrator responsible for Hozon New Energy’s bankruptcy restructuring has not yet released updates. Adding to the uncertainty surrounding Neta Auto’s revival, on August 12th, Hozon New Energy Auto Co., Ltd. was listed as a dishonest judgment debtor by Guangzhou Haizhu District People’s Court for violating property reporting requirements. The company has completely failed to fulfill its obligations, and its legal representative Fang Yunzhou has been restricted from high consumption.
Two months ago, in a short video, Fang Yunzhou faced an office packed with employees demanding overdue wages, saying, “We all worked together before, why are you doing this now? You should file claims where appropriate.” In another video, Fang questioned employees: “We’re working on debt resolution. Have I left?”
Now, that crowded, noisy Neta Auto Shanghai headquarters is empty. The (former) employee accounts that posted wage-demand videos have either disappeared or stopped updating. Neta Auto’s rebirth remains uncertain—we’ll see which “Taiyi Zhenren” earns the right to revive it.
2.Middle Eastern Tycoon’s Love at First Sight: HiPhi Still Struggles with Life and Death
In comparison, HiPhi, which went bankrupt earlier, also found a buyer earlier.
In late May 2025, news exploded that HiPhi would receive up to $1 billion in funding from EV Electra Ltd., reportedly backed by Middle Eastern Lebanese capital. The investor also promised future overseas purchase orders of no less than 100,000 vehicles or $3 billion over three years.
On May 22nd, Jiangsu HiPhi Automobile Co., Ltd. was registered with capital exceeding $143 million (over 1 billion yuan), with legal representative Jihad Mohammad and registered address in Yancheng, Jiangsu. The new company’s controlling shareholder is EV Electra Ltd. with 69.8%, while Human Horizons (Jiangsu) Technology Co., Ltd. holds 30.2%.
A month later, HiPhi’s new owner proudly brought the HiPhi Y and HiPhi Z to the Dubai Motor Show, basking in the glory of Middle Eastern tycoons queuing to see the cars while revealing plans for HiPhi’s next steps.
“We just completed this acquisition, controlling nearly 70%. Many Chinese media misunderstood—we’re not a Lebanese company but a Canadian company. We just have an office in Lebanon to manage Chinese business,” revealed Jihad Mohammad, HiPhi’s new owner, speaking with a self-media outlet at the Dubai Motor Show.
Why choose to acquire HiPhi? Jihad said: “Love at first sight! No exaggeration, this is the Maybach of the new energy world.” In his plans, HiPhi would soon release entirely new designs, with product prices in the Chinese market dropping by half compared to before.
While the major Middle Eastern shareholder planned the future in Dubai, Human Horizons (Jiangsu) Technology Co., Ltd. and 52 other companies were still recruiting strategic restructuring investors.
Everything seemed to be developing positively for HiPhi’s revival, but under Jihad Mohammad’s interview video, many netizens felt this Middle Eastern tycoon had “impure motives,” believing his current actions regarding HiPhi were “all tricks LeEco played years ago” and calling it a “shell company—who knows who they’re trying to fleece next.”
Whether the Middle Eastern businessman is “getting something for nothing” remains uncertain, but after his high-profile publicity, not a single cent of the promised billion-yuan funding has arrived.
In early July, domestic media reported that EV Electra had not paid any funds, and negotiations between both parties had stalled.
Jihad Mohammad’s response to the media was that over 51% of creditors signing investment agreement support letters was a prerequisite for his first payment, but only 11 creditors had signed at the time, and the signed support letter format didn’t meet his requirements.
According to agreements, EV Electra needs to pay a total of $600 million in HiPhi’s restructuring plan. After 51% or more creditors sign support letters for the investment agreement, EV Electra would pay a $100 million deposit, then another $100 million after restructuring completion, with the remaining $400 million paid in two installments in the second and third years after restructuring completion.
To date, the hundreds of millions in Middle Eastern funding to “transfuse” HiPhi remains a paper figure. Whether HiPhi can truly rise from the dead remains uncertain.
3.WM Motor Awaits a “Clay Buddha”
From a legal execution perspective, WM Motor’s bankruptcy restructuring process is faster than Human Horizons and Hozon New Energy—it has completed investor recruitment and entered the bankruptcy restructuring execution phase.
Shenzhen Xiangfei Auto Sales Co., Ltd. (hereafter “Xiangfei Auto”) is WM Motor’s sole restructuring investor. In July this year, a screenshot of a “New WM Motor White Paper to Suppliers” circulated online, reportedly from a document Xiangfei Auto sent to WM suppliers.
The screenshot revealed planning content showing:
2025-2026: Resume production of EX5 and E.5 classic models in September 2025, ensuring annual production and sales of 10,000 units, striving for 20,000. Simultaneously establish Thailand KD factory, expanding into Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern markets, targeting 100,000 units in 2026.
2027-2028: Sales targets jumping from 250,000 to 400,000 units, mass-producing advanced driver assistance vehicles, initiating IPO preparations.
2029-2030: Challenge annual production of 1 million units and revenue of 120 billion yuan, building a smart mobility ecosystem.
Logically, this news should have been explosive, but it actually didn’t create much buzz in the industry. The attention received was far less than HiPhi’s entanglement with the Middle Eastern tycoon.
Why? The answer perhaps lies in the fact that investor Xiangfei Auto itself is “a clay buddha crossing the river.”
Business registration data shows Xiangfei Auto’s actual controller Huang Jing is currently under high-consumption restrictions; major shareholder Shenzhen Zhuokai Enterprise Management Co., Ltd. is currently in abnormal business status.
Furthermore, Xiangfei Auto’s background relationships are complex.
One of Xiangfei Auto’s controlling shareholders is Shenzhen Fengyu Management Co., Ltd., which is also a controlling shareholder of Youbaojia Auto. The latter’s legal representative and executive director Zhang Xiao simultaneously holds senior positions at multiple Baoneng Auto-affiliated companies, including Baoneng Auto Sales Co., Ltd. and Baoneng New Energy Auto Group Co., Ltd.
This means the real actor behind WM’s revival might be the Baoneng conglomerate.
This speculation was confirmed in June when media photographed two WM vehicles displayed at a Baoneng Auto showroom in Shenzhen.
The Baoneng name is familiar—as a representative of real estate companies entering automotive manufacturing, Baoneng’s car-making venture carries the same “barbarian” aggressive imprint as Evergrande. It once acquired Qoros Auto, invested in Guangzhou Newtel, and established eight production bases totaling over 10,000 acres through self-construction or acquisitions within just a few years.
However, as the real estate industry entered decline, Baoneng Group’s main business struggled to “transfuse” the automotive business, causing Baoneng’s car-making to gradually fade from its previous high-profile “money-throwing” approach into obscurity.
Latest business information shows Baoneng Group itself faces over 50 billion yuan in enforcement amounts. WM Motor has audited liabilities of 20.367 billion yuan, asset valuation of only 4.1 billion yuan, main restructuring creditor rights exceeding 14.8 billion yuan, and deferred creditor rights of 11.2 billion yuan (data as of early 2024).
If investors want to revive WM Motor, initial resumption alone requires an estimated tens of billions in cash, with full restart potentially requiring over 10 billion yuan.
This raises questions: How can Xiangfei Auto with its “consumption-restricted” actual controller and debt-ridden Baoneng operate WM’s revival? Why would Xiangfei and Baoneng, themselves struggling, take over WM?
When Baoneng still controlled Qoros Auto, industry insiders believed Baoneng’s car-making was “essentially using it as a financing tool and land-grabbing prop.”
After WM Motor encountered operational difficulties in 2023, its Wenzhou Oujiang Kou production base remained idle. In September 2024, Wenzhou Haijing District Management Committee replied to citizen questions on a government-public interaction platform, stating they “don’t rule out introducing vehicle manufacturers as strategic investors to revitalize the Wenzhou factory capacity.” This reply also revealed that Wenzhou Haijing District’s WM task force office is responsible for promoting related work and resolving historical issues.
According to reports, to help WM resume production, local government and Wenzhou Marine Economic Development Demonstration Zone have established special working groups, considering providing WM with resumption subsidies, production line technical transformation support, product R&D and marketing subsidies, and prioritizing new WM for local public procurement through “policy + market” measures to help new WM restart.
However, the above information couldn’t be further confirmed through official channels. Observers believe Baoneng’s use of Xiangfei Auto to “revive” WM is likely still focused on WM’s land resources—the Wenzhou production base.
As for WM Motor’s 2030 target of one million annual units, this is like EV Electra’s promise to inject $1 billion into HiPhi—just listen and don’t take it seriously.
4.Chen Xuanlin’s Aiways Auto Scheme
“Watch him build a tall building, watch it collapse.”
WM Motor, HiPhi, and Nta—these former car-making stars are queuing to enter bankruptcy restructuring. They can no longer control their fate, leaving only scattered assets hoping to sell and pay debts.
Buyers among them seek and desire to profit from these “fallen phoenixes,” squeezing out the last residual value from the first generation of outdated startups. So what kind of tricks can these buyers pull? Perhaps Chen Xuanlin’s Aiways Auto scheme serves as an example.
Chen Xuanlin’s involvement in Aiways Auto’s financial storm stems from a massive illegal fundraising case involving over 30 billion yuan.
Born in 1987 in Taizhou, Zhejiang, Chen Xuanlin’s father Chen Yong is the actual controller of Zhongtong Holding Group, mainly operating luxury car 4S stores. Chen Xuanlin studied in the UK and returned to China in 2006, profiting considerably from stock trading. In 2017, he established Guangwei Holdings and began expanding into new energy vehicles. He first spent 600 million yuan to acquire established bus company Wanxiang Auto, then invested in Aiways Auto, initially as a minor shareholder.
By late 2021, Aiways Auto faced financial crisis due to poor sales (only about 5,000 units sold in 2020-2021), with only 54.64 million yuan cash on hand but 3.359 billion yuan in debt. At this point, Chen Xuanlin offered a 2.5 billion yuan capital increase plan through his Dongbo Group, replacing founder Fu Qiang as Aiways chairman, with complete management team overhaul.
Chen Xuanlin’s funding sources were suspicious. Through Shanghai Beiguang Investment Management Co., Ltd., he used 10% annual yields as bait to issue “fixed financing products” through “pseudo-financial exchange” registration, raising funds from the public. These products packaged as “trust-like” instruments were actually unregulated illegal deposit-taking tools.
From 2018 to 2022, Beiguang Investment illegally absorbed over 30 billion yuan in public deposits, with 13 billion yuan unrepaid at the time of discovery. Of this, 1.5 billion yuan flowed to Aiways Auto, 6.3 billion yuan to Wanxiang Auto, and 4.5 billion yuan to Guangwei Holdings’ capital pool. Of the 1.5 billion yuan Aiways received, 1.416 billion yuan came directly from Beiguang Investment’s “Aiways Auto Direct Financing Plan” series products.
On November 26, 2022, Beiguang Investment suddenly announced that “due to Chen Xuanlin’s personal reasons, some products cannot be honored,” triggering the incident. Over 30 Beiguang Investment middle and senior managers were charged with illegal deposit absorption, with cases heard in May-June 2024.
In 2024, Aiways Auto faced multiple billion-yuan enforcement actions, with 860 million yuan in equity frozen and Jiangxi Shangrao factory assets seized. While Wanxiang Auto claims “normal operations,” the whereabouts of 6.3 billion yuan remains questionable; Guangwei Holdings’ 4.5 billion yuan was used for projects like “Chongqing Tower,” which ultimately failed.
Chen Xuanlin himself was listed as a dishonest judgment debtor, but he had already fled to the United States, reportedly transferring at least 5.3 billion yuan through various channels. He also purchased a beachside villa for $7.88 million and employed 24-hour armed security services.
Source:https://inabr.com/news/21713